In response to needs of disk encryption standardization bodies, we provide the first tweakable ciphers that are proven to securely encipher their own keys. We provide both a narrowblock design StE and a wideblock design EtE. Our proofs assume only standard PRP-CCA security of the underlying tweakable ciphers.
INTRODUCTION
In email archives of discussions of candidate enciphering schemes for disk encryption, conducted by the Security in Storage Working Group (IEEE P1619), one sees the intriguing comment "I have not received any meaningful response to the issue of grandma storing her keys on an encrypted drive. The WG must have considered it the first time it came up." The issue is whether it is safe to encipher the enciphering key itself. The group eventually came to the conclusion that keyenciphering security is important and desirable, for reasons that go beyond grandma. The presence of key-enciphering * Suppored in part by NSF grants CCF 0915675 and CNS 0904380.
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attacks on one candidate (LRW) then influenced rejecting it in favor of others on which attacks were not found. Meanwhile, the group did value security proofs. EME [15] , a wideblock cipher, is proven to achieve PRP-CCA security. (Disk encryption must be length preserving, so we are talking about ciphers, not randomized modes like CBC.) A variant EME2 [12] was standardized on the strength of these proofs, a host of efficiency properties, and the presumed security of enciphering the key.
If (as seems the consensus in this domain) key enciphering security is a requirement, and (as also seems the consensus) proofs are also important, a discrepancy becomes obvious, namely that, while there is a proof of PRP-CCA security, there is no proof of key enciphering security, confidence in the latter resting only on the absence of discovered attacks.
The question this raises is, can we fill the gap? We want efficient tweakable ciphers, both narrowblock (data is n bits long where n is the blocklength of the underlying blockcipher) and wideblock (data is mn bits long for m ≥ 2). They should be not only proven PRP-CCA secure but also proven to securely encipher data that contains their own keys. (In the narrowblock case this means the message might equal the key, while in the wideblock case it means any block of the message might equal the key.) We do not want to use random oracles (ROs) but rather want to prove all this assuming only what was assumed for EME, namely the standard PRP-CCA security of the underlying blockcipher.
Is this possible? Proving security of encryption of keydependent messages is notoriously hard. Standard reduction techniques fail completely. The first solutions [6] used ROs. Sophisticated, non-RO solutions based on novel techniques have emerged [7, 1, 8, 2] but they are far from practical.
In this paper we show nonetheless how to achieve the stated objective. We first provide StE, a simple and efficient transform that, applied to any tweakable PRP-CCA blockcipher, results in a tweakable narrowblock cipher that is not only proven PRP-CCA but also proven to securely encipher its own key, assuming only PRP-CCA security of the starting tweakable blockcipher. We then use StE as the basis for EtE, a transform that, applied to any tweakable PRP-CCA wideblock cipher, results in another tweakable wideblock cipher that, again, is not only proven PRP-CCA but also proven to securely encipher data containing its own key in any block, assuming only PRP-CCA security of the starting wideblock tweakable cipher and of the tweakable blockcipher underlying StE.
Motivated also by the above mentioned issues for disk encryption, Halevi and Krawczyk [13] had initiated the study of PRFs and PRPs secure for key dependent messages (KDMs). They were able to provide (1) standard model KDM secure PRFs, which are not invertible and thus cannot do disk encryption (2) KDM secure PRPs, but in the ideal cipher model. Ours are the first constructions of KDM secure PRPs with a proof of security in the standard (as opposed to random oracle or ideal cipher) model.
We instantiated EtE with AES as the base blockcipher, tweaked via XEX [18] , and with EME as the base wideblock cipher. We implemented this with the AES-NI instruction set. We found that EtE is only 15% slower than plain EME.
Background. Security for key-dependent data was first considered for (randomized) IND-CPA encryption [6] , so that solutions (which were provided in the RO model by [6] ) are necessarily length increasing. For disk encryption, the encryption function must be length preserving. The desired primitive is a tweakable cipher [16] 
mn that deterministically maps an n-bit key K, a tweak T ∈ T and an m-block plaintext M to an m-block ciphertext E(K, T, M ). (So n is both the keylength and the blocklength.) It must be invertible, meaning E(K, T, ·): {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} mn is, for every K, T , a permutation whose inverse we denote by E −1 (K, T, ·). This is a (tweakable) blockcipher, or a narrowblock design, if m = 1, and a wideblock design if m > 1. Both are of interest to the Security in Storage Working Group, the first under P1619 and the second under P1619.2. In disk encryption the tweak could be the sector number (wideblock) or the block index (narrowblock) and its use significantly increases security.
The standard security notion for a (tweakable) cipher is to be PRP-CCA secure [16] . (This is sometimes called strong PRP security following the terminology of [17] .) We extend this to key dependent messages (KDM), defining what it means for E to be Φ-PRP-CCA secure where Φ is a class of functions that map n-bit keys to mn-bit inputs, following [6, 13] . The game picks a random challenge bit b, a random key K and a random permutation π(T, ·): {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} mn for each T . It gives the adversary the standard oracles Fn, Fn −1 from the PRP-CCA game and a new oracle KDFn. Oracle Fn, on input T, M , returns E(K, T, M ) if b = 1 and π(T, M ) otherwise; oracle Fn −1 , on input T, C, returns E −1 (K, T, C) if b = 1 and π −1 (T, C) otherwise; oracle KDFn, on input φ, T , where φ is required to be in Φ, returns E(K, T, φ(K)) if b = 1 and π(T, φ(K)) otherwise. To ensure non-triviality, the adversary is required to be legitimate, meaning does not query Fn −1 (T, C) for a C previously received as a response to a KDFn(T, ·) query. The adversary advantage is 2 Pr[b = b ′ ] − 1 where b ′ is its output bit. Φ-PRP-CCA security obviously implies PRP-CCA security for all Φ, and coincides with it when Φ = ∅.
What we mean by "encrypting the key" depends on whether the design is narrowblock or wideblock. In the narrowblock case, we are concerned with the obvious, namely that the message equals the key, captured formally by letting Φ consist of the identity function id. For wideblock designs, we seek security when any block of the message equals the key. (This reflects P1619.2 requirements.) We clarify that the key may occur in multiple blocks but may not overlap between blocks.
is the message then M [i] may equal the key K for any i but we do not allow K to start somewhere in one block and end somewhere in the next block. In Section 4 we specify a Φ, that we denote IDm, that captures this formally.
The Security in Storage Working Group advocates security for encrypting the key because users or the system may store the key on the disk but also because, if it would create a vulnerability, an attacker could attempt to manipulate the system so that it transfers the key from memory to the disk. Overall, they considered it important enough to reject candidates without the property.
Attacks of Halevi and Krawczyk [13] show that, unlike for randomized encryption [6] , there is no cipher that is Φ-PRP-CCA secure for the class Φ of all functions. To achieve security, we must restrict the class somehow. The restriction we make, namely to consider encrypting the key, results in a class capturing practical attacks for which we will show security to be achievable.
Motivated by the concerns and needs of the Security in Storage Working Group that we have explained, Halevi and Krawczyk [13] introduced the notions of KDM secure PRFs and PRPs and asked whether there exist Φ-PRFs or Φ-PRPs for non-trivial Φ. (Meaning, Φ contains some interesting non-constant function such as the identity.) They were able to give a standard model construct in the PRF case, but it was not invertible and thus could not be used for disk encryption. They also gave a PRP but the proof is in the ideal cipher model. Left open by their work is to provide a Φ-PRP for non-trivial Φ in the standard model. We resolve this, providing not only constructs, but efficient ones, with proofs not only in the standard model but assuming only standard PRP security of the underlying blockcipher, for non-trivial Φ of practical interest, with tweaks, and for both the narrow and wide block settings.
Approach. First we address the narrowblock case, providing a transform StE that turns a given PRP-CCA tweakable blockcipher into a {id}-PRP-CCA tweakable blockcipher, meaning the constructed cipher not only preserves the PRP-CCA security of the base one but, assuming only PRP-CCA security of the latter, is proven to securely encrypt its key. StE is of interest in its own right as the first (tweakable) blockcipher that can provably encipher its own key under standard and minimal assumptions.
We would have liked to show that instantiating the base blockcipher of E of EME [15] with F = StE[E] results in a wideblock cipher that can provably encipher its own key, but this does not work. Instead, we show how to add a pre-processing step to EME, or any other PRP-CCA secure wideblock cipher, to get another wideblock cipher that now, when instantiated with F as the underlying blockcipher, is IDm-PRP-CCA secure, meaning not only PRP-CCA secure but able to securely encipher messages that contain the key in any block. Let us now look at these two contributions more closely. Narrowblock design. Our starting point is a suggestion of [7] to securely encrypt keys with a randomized encryption scheme by exchanging the key with another point. To make this work for deterministic encryption we swap with a "hidden" point, the latter determined by encryption under the key of a constant. A crucial idea is to use tweaks, defining the hidden point via a tweak not used for anything else.
We take as given a tweakable blockcipher E: {0, 1} n ×T × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n assumed to have normal, meaning PRP-CCA, security, but not necessarily able to securely encrypt its key. We pick an arbitrary tweak γ ∈ T for E and also an arbitrary point α ∈ {0, 1} n . Both α and γ are public and known to the adversary. Our StE (Swap-then-Encipher) transform now turns E into another tweakable blockcipher F : {0, 1} n × T \ {γ} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n whose tweakspace T \{γ} is that of E with γ removed, meaning γ is not allowed as a tweak for F . We define F via
In Section 3 we show that F is invertible, as required to be a cipher. A curious aspect of the design is that at the third line we actually encrypt the key K with the original blockcipher E. Given that the latter may not necessarily be able to securely encrypt its key, why would this work? The answer is that we only do this if M = H and we ensure the latter is very unlikely. Thus H is our "hidden" point.
Making sure H is hidden takes some care. It is not so merely because its computation depends on K, for the adversary will have an oracle that (at least in the real game) allow it to compute F under K for any tweak of the adversary's choice and this might be used to extract information about H. The crucial point is that γ, the tweak used in computing H, was removed from the tweak space of F so the adversary cannot use it.
The proof that F indeed securely encrypts its key is done by reduction to the assumed PRP-CCA security of E and is delicate due to the cyclic nature of the construction.
It is crucial for disk encryption that F is invertible. It is to ensure this that we need the swap that effectively exchanges the roles of K and H.
At first glance it would appear that StE doubles the cost since it requires two invocations of E, one to get H and the other to get Y . This, however, is also true of XEX-AES [18] : presented as a fast tweakable blockcipher, XEX actually requires two invocations of the underlying blockcipher. In both cases, however, the answer is the same, namely that the ciphers will be used in a mode where the extra blockcipher computation is done once and its cost is thus amortized out so that the effective cost of the cipher is one blockcipher call. Specifically if F , like XEX-AES, is used as the base blockcipher in a wideblock design to encipher a sector consisting of m blocks (eg. m = 32), we can compute H just once across the m encipherings so StE effectively involves just a single blockcipher invocation.
The IEEE 1619 standard for narrowblock encryption is based on XEX-AES [18] . StE is easily applied here, yielding an alternative narrowblock candidate that is as efficient as the current one when the cost of computing H is amortized out, but also has provable security for enciphering the key.
Wideblock design. EME [15] is a wideblock tweakable cipher that is proven PRP-CCA secure assuming only PRP-CCA security of the underlying blockcipher. It makes two passes through the data and runs at 2 blockcipher invocations per message block. One of its attractions, and its advantage over the earlier CMC [14] , is that it is parallelizable. No attack is known when one encrypts messages containing the key in any block, but nor is there any proof that such an attack is absent.
We wish to enhance designs like EME so that PRP-CCA security is preserved but provable key-enciphering security is also added, without assuming any more of the underlying blockcipher than PRP-CCA security. Our EtE transform does just this. It makes an ECB pass through the data using F = StE[E] under one tweak and then applies any wideblock PRP-CCA cipher (EME would be one possibility) using F with another tweak. We prove that the resulting cipher is IDm-PRP-CCA secure assuming only that tweakable blockcipher E is PRP-CCA secure. Thus EtE provides a generic way to upgrade any PRP-CCA wideblock cipher to also be able to securely encipher messages containing the key in any block, at the cost of one extra blockcipher operation per block. The design preserves parallelizability, so that when instantiated with a parallelizable wideblock cipher like EME, the resulting cipher is also parallelizable.
Instantiation and implementation. Getting the best out of EtE requires good choices for the underlying components and some optimizations. We use AES as the base blockcipher and XEX [18] to tweak it. We use EME as the wideblock cipher. Let J denote the resulting wideblock cipher as produced by EtE. We implemented J, as well as plain EME for comparison, on an Intel Xeon W3690 processor at 3.47 GHz with support for AES-NI running Linux version 2.6 with code compiled using gcc -O3 -ftree-vectorize -msse2 -ffast-math to enable vector instructions and perform other general optimizations. The base code was from Brian Gladman's EME2 implementation [10] , which we modified to run as EME and use the hardware AES instructions. Our experiments show that J is only 15% slower than EME.
Recall that EME uses about two blockcipher calls per message block. Since J would thus use three blockcipher calls per message block, one might naively expect a 50% slowdown. However, EME computes various offsets that are added to the blockcipher inputs and outputs, and these computations are quite costly, so our simple ECB pass is less expensive compared to EME than one might imagine. We remark that AES-NI is now widely available in Intel and AMD processors on modern machines, and disk controllers might potentially have hardware AES support as well, so using AES-NI as a starting point is realistic.
A CCS 2011 reviewer asked us to also implement in eBASH. As of the time of writing this CCS abstract, we have not completed such an implementation.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. By Maps(D, R) we denote the set of all functions f : D → R. We denote by id the identity function. Some of our definitions and proofs are expressed via codebased games [5] . Recall that such a game -see Figure 1 for an example -consists of an Initialize procedure, procedures to respond to adversary oracle queries, and a Finalize procedure. A game G is executed with an adversary A as follows. First, Initialize executes. Then A executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of G. When A terminates, its output becomes the input to Finalize, and the output of the latter is the output of the game. We denote by "G A " the event that this game output takes value true. Boolean flags are assumed initialized to false. The running time of an adversary by convention is the worst case time for the execution of the adversary with the game defining its security, so that the time of the called game procedures is included.
m that takes input a k-bit key K, a tweak T drawn from the tweakspace T and a m-bit message M to return an m-bit output E(K, T, M ).
m returns E(K, T, M ) is required to be a permutation and its inverse is denoted E −1 (K, T, ·). The standard notion of security for a tweakable blockcipher is to be a tweakable pseudorandom permutation [16] . This can be considered under either chosen-plaintext attack (usually called PRP security) or chosen-ciphertext attack (usually called strong PRP security) [16, 17] , but we will use the terms PRP-CPA and PRP-CCA as more indicative of the models and more consistent with notation for other primitives. We will be working with PRP-CCA. To define it consider games RealE and RandE of Figure 1 . In Rand, we are denoting by TwPm(T , {0, 1} m ) the set of all π:
m is the inverse of π(T, ·). We define the prp-cca advantage of A as
KDM PRP-CCA security. We extend PRP-CCA to allow for the encryption of key-dependent messages via games RealE,Φ and RandE,Φ of Figure 1 . Oracle KDFn takes input a tweak T and a function φ ∈ Maps({0,
we say that adversary A is Φ-restricted if the argument φ in its KDFn queries is always from Φ. We define the Φ-kdm-prp-cca advantage of such an A to be
We continue, thus, to denote the notion via prp-cca, the key-dependent messages indicated by the extra subscript Φ in the advantage function.
Consider the following strategy for A. It makes KDFn query T, id to get back a ciphertext C and then queries Fn −1 (T, C). The response will be M = id(K) = K, and now A has the key and can easily win. (That is, get a high advantage, for example by returning 1 if E(K, T, M ′ ) = Fn(T, M ′ ) for some T and some M ′ = M , and 0 otherwise.) To preclude this, we require that A is legitimate, meaning that, for all T, φ, it never makes a Fn −1 (T, C) query for C previously received in response to a KDFn(T, φ) query. The analogy is the definition of IND-CCA secure encryption where the adversary is not allowed to query to the decryption oracle a ciphertext it previously received as a challenge. The (necessary) assumption that adversaries are legitimate is made throughout and is implicit in all our results. We remark that we do not need to prohibit A from query Fn −1 (T, C) for C previously returned in response to query Fn(T, M ), because A already knows the message M it would get as response. So no restriction is present in the plain prp-cca notion. But when key-dependent messages are introduced, we must require legitimacy.
KDM-secure IND-CPA encryption was defined by [6] . Subsequently, KDM security of tweakable blockciphers was defined by Halevi and Krawczyk [13] . Because blockciphers, unlike encryption schemes, are deterministic, KDM security is not achievable when arbitrary functions φ are allowed in KDFn queries. This is analogous to what happens with related-key attacks (RKAs) and thus, as with the formalization of RKA security from [4] , Halevi and Krawczyk [13] parameterize the advantage and definition of KDM security for tweakable blockciphers by a class Φ of functions. Our narrow-block design StE will achieve security when Φ = {id}, corresponding to encrypting the key. Our extended cipher GStE will achieve security for a broader class Φ and our wideblock design for Φ corresponding to any block of the message equaling the key.
Halevi and Krawczyk [13] do not explicitly state the legitimacy condition. They also allow the possibility of decryption of key-dependent ciphertexts, via an extra oracle. We have not considered this capability because, while plaintexts may be key dependent, we did not see why ciphertexts would be key dependent. Our schemes do not aim to achieve security in the presence of decryption of key-dependent ciphertexts.
NARROWBLOCK CIPHER
In this section we show how to construct a narrowblock tweakable blockcipher that can securely encipher its own key.
n be a tweakable blockcipher whose key length and message length are the same value n. (For example, n = 128 for XEX-AES [18] .) We fix an arbitrary tweak γ ∈ T as well as an arbitrary message α ∈ {0, 1} n . Both γ and α are public parameters of the system known to the adversary. Our Swap-then-Encipher transform StEγ,α associates to E another tweakable blockcipher
n → {0, 1} n whose tweak space T \ {γ} is that of E with the point γ removed. The function F is defined as follows:
Before considering security, We establish that F is invertible as required to be a tweakable blockcipher. Indeed, the inverse F −1 is given by
Efficiency. In the form it is described above, evaluating F requires two calls to the underlying cipher E. But in practice we are enciphering a message consisting of multiple blocks. In this case the value E(K, γ, α) can be computed just once and then cached, which means each evaluation of F (K, T, M ) requires one call to E with the same key and tweak value. Similarly, E(K, γ, α) can also be cached for inversion. Thus, the amortized cost of StEγ,α is the same as that of E. We remark that the situation here is analogous to that of XEX [18] . XEX too needs two applications of the underlying blockcipher, but one can usually be amortized out. StE is no worse.
Figure 1: Games RealE, RandE to define PRP-CCA security, and games RealE,Φ, RandE,Φ to define KDM PRP-CCA security of tweakable blockcipher E:
Security. The following theorem says that
is a PRP-CCA that can securely encipher its own key, or more formally, that it is {id}-kdm-prp-cca secure, assuming only that E meets the standard PRP-CCA notion of security.
n be a tweakable blockcipher. Let γ ∈ T and α ∈ {0, 1} n .
n be the tweakable blockcipher associated to E via the StEγ,α transform as defined above. Let Φ = {id} consist of the identity function. Let A be an adversary making at most Q oracle queries. Then there is an adversary B such that
Moreover, the running time of B is about equal to the running time of A.
The intuition is that, during the Real F,{id} and Rand F,{id} games, an adversary is unlikely to trigger the test in lines 02 and 03 in the computation of F , except by submitting φ = id to its oracle. Once this established, we can give a reduction to the prp-cca security of E. For the first part, we show that K and H are hard to guess using the prp-cca security of E. If the adversary guesses K, then we can show how to break the prp-cca security of E, a contradiction. We can show the same if the adversary guesses H. This is where we use the fact that the tweak γ is never allowed elsewhere, effectively making H look random. The proof implements this approach and deals with other complications.
Proof. We begin with the games in Figure 2 . Recall that here Φ = {id}, so it is assumed that φ = id in any KDFn query. Game G0 includes the boxed code and hence is the same as Real A F , and thus we have Adv
The inequality is by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [5] since G0, G1 are identical until bad. We design adversary B1 so that
The simulation is straightforward since G1 does not include the boxed code. B1 has oracles Fn, Fn −1 . It starts by letting H ← Fn(γ, α). It then runs A. When A makes a query (T, M ) to its Fn oracle, B1 queries its own Fn oracle with (T, M ) and forwards the response to A. Similarly when A makes a query (T, C) to its Fn −1 oracle, B1 queries its own Fn −1 oracle with (T, C) and forwards the response to A. When A queries its KDFn oracle with T, id, adversary B1 responds with Fn(T, H). When A halts with output b ′ , so does B1. We clearly have Pr[Real
Since the tweak γ is not used in any queries of A, the point H in G2 is random and can be viewed as playing the role of K in game RandE. Thus we also have Pr[Rand
Thus we have Equation (1) .
It remains to upper bound Pr[Bad(G A 1 )]. Fix a point α ′ ∈ {0, 1} n \ {α} and consider games G3, G4 of Figure 2 . Game G3 replaces the M = K test from G1 with the test E(M, γ, α ′ ) = H ′ . The purpose is to avoid referring explicitly to K, thereby opening the way for a reduction to the assumed prp-cca security of E. This new test, however, will certainly return true if M = K and hence
We stress that in G4, where we move to the random world by replacing E(K, ·, ·) by π(·, ·), the test still uses E, invoking the blockcipher here explicitly on inputs M, γ, α ′ . (The test does not use π.) We design adversary B2 so that
The simulation is again straightforward now that K is not referred to explicitly in either game. B2 has oracles Fn, Fn −1 . It starts by letting H ← Fn(γ, α) and initializing boolean variables bad1, bad2 to false. It then runs A. When A makes a query (T, M ) to its Fn oracle, B2 does the following:
Similarly when A makes a query (T, C) to its Fn −1 oracle, B2 does the following: Let B be the adversary that picks c at random from {1, 2} and runs Bc. Then at this point we have
and proceed to upper bound the last term above, considering separately the probability of setting bad1 and that of setting bad2. Since γ is not in the tweak space of F , game G5 of Figure 3 picks π from TwPm(T \ {γ}, {0, 1} n ) rather than TwPm(T , {0, 1} n ), and picks H, H ′ as random, distinct points. The game can move the setting of bad1 and the choice of H ′ to Finalize without impacting what is returned to the adversary. At the end of the execution, the set S can have size at most Q so
Bounding the probability that bad2 is set in G4 is more difficult because information about H does reach the adversary via the KDFn query. Our intent is to move to a game where H is not referred to in replying to adversary oracle queries. We begin with game G6 of Figure 3 [5] says that identical until bad games have the same probability of setting bad and hence
But game G7, which excludes the boxed code, does not refer to H in replying to adversary oracle queries, and hence
Since A is legitimate, a Fn −1 (T, C) query with C = YT must occur before it receives YT from KDFn and hence is made with no knowledge of YT . Thus the probability that a query of A sets bad is at most 2 −n . (We remark that this is the place we use the assumption that A is legitimate, without which bad could be set with probability one.) On the other hand the set S has size at most Q at the end of the execution
Return bad The IEEE 1619 standard for narrowblock encryption is based on XEX-AES [18] . StE is an alternative narrowblock candidate that is essentially as efficient as the current one but also has provable security for enciphering the key.
WIDEBLOCK CIPHER
We provide a simple and general way to enhance a given PRP-CCA wideblock cipher to be able to encrypt messages that might, in any block, contain the key. Our construction simply puts an ECB layer in front of the given cipher and then uses StE as the base tweakable blockcipher for both the ECB pass and the application of the wideblock cipher. This works for any given wideblock cipher that is a mode of operation of a blockcipher, meaning it uses the key only to key an underlying blockcipher, as is the case with EME and other standard designs. StE is used with one tweak for the ECB pass and then, by fixing a different tweak, yields a blockcipher to instantiate the wideblock mode of operation.
We begin, below, by defining what it means for a wideblock design to be a mode of operation and what it means to assume it is PRP-CCA secure. Then we provide our construction and prove it secure.
Modes. A wideblock mode of operation WB = (WB, WB −1 ) is a pair of oracle algorithms. Given oracle access to a permutation g: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , algorithm WB takes input a tweak T ∈ T and an m-block message X ∈ {0, 1} mn to return an m-block ciphertext denoted WB(T, X : g). Given oracle access to g −1 , algorithm WB −1 takes input a tweak T ∈ T and an m-block ciphertext Y ∈ {0, 1} mn to return an m-block message denoted WB −1 (T, Y : g −1 ). It is required that WB −1 (T, WB(T, X : g) : g −1 ) = X for all choices of the inputs and oracles. Here T , n, m are the tweak space, blocklength and number of blocks associated to WB.
If N : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a blockcipher then WB associates to it a tweakable blockcipher W = WB [N ] where
. EME is an example of a wideblock mode of operation that, in this way, transforms a given blockcipher into a wideblock tweakable cipher.
Let WB = (WB, WB −1 ) be a wideblock mode of operation. Consider the games of Figure 4 and let where the maximum is over all adversaries B making at most Q oracle queries with the tweak argument in each query having length at most nt. Proving security of a mode of operation ubiquitously proceeds by upper bounding this advantage as a function of Q, n, m, t. This is a purely information theoretic setting, and absolute bounds are provided. For example, for EME, it is shown in [15] that this advantage is at most 7(Qt + qn + 1) 2 /2 n . (EME requires m ≤ n, assumed in this bound.) PRP-CCA security of WB[N ] follows from the assumption that N is a PRP-CCA secure blockcipher by a standard reduction argument.
Construction. Let ECB denote the oracle algorithm that given oracle access to a permutation g: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and given input
) be a wideblock mode of operation with tweakspace T , blocklength n and number of blocks m. Let F : {0, 1} n × {γ1, γ2} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a tweakable blockcipher with a tweakspace of size two.
(Of course, any tweakable blockcipher with an even larger tweakspace will do. Just drop all but two possible tweaks.) Our EtE (ECB-then-encipher) transform associates to WB and F a tweakable wideblock cipher J = EtE[WB, F ] where J: {0, 1} n × T × {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} mn is defined as follows:
The inverse is defined by
We take advantage here of the fact that ECB(· : g −1 ) is the inverse of ECB(· : g).
When instantiated with EME in the role of WB this uses three blockcipher invocations per block, but retains the parallelizability of EME. F would be obtained by applying StE to some tweakable blockcipher with a tweakspace of size three.
The class IDm. We formally define the class Φ capturing occurrence of the key in any block of the message. Associate to any m-vector M over {0, 1}
n ∪ {⊥} the function idM : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} mn that on input a key K ∈ {0, 1} n returns the message
Then IDm is the class of all idM as M ranges over all m-vectors over {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥}. This is the class Φ we will consider.
Security. Assume WB is PRP-CCA secure and assume F is {id}-PRP-CCA secure, meaning can safely encrypt its own key. We claim that J is IDm-PRP-CCA secure, meaning can safely encrypt messages that contain the key in any block.
Theorem 4.1. Let WB = (WB, WB −1 ) be a wideblock mode of operation with tweakspace T , blocklength n and number of blocks m. Let F : {0, 1} n ×{γ1, γ2}×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a tweakable blockcipher. Let J = EtE[WB, F ] be the wideblock tweakable cipher associated to WB and F via the EtE transform as defined above. Let Φ = IDm. Let A be an adversary making at most Q oracle queries with the tweak argument in each query having length at most nt. Then there is an adversary B such that
, where δ(WB) = Adv prp-cca WB (Q, n, m, t). Moreover, the running time of B is about equal to the running time of A.
The proof would seem at first to be a quite straightforward simulation in which KDFn queries of A can be answered via KDFn queries of B. The subtle issue is that B needs to be legitimate and this means it cannot answer all Fn −1 queries of A. Ensuring B is legitimate makes the proof more involved.
Proof. We begin with the games in Figure 5 . We have
proc Initialize / / G0, G1
Return (b ′ = 1) the inequality by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [5] . We will design (legitimate!) B1, B2 so that
Due to space restrictions, the descriptions of B1, B2 are omitted and can be found in the full version of this paper [3] . Let B pick i ∈ {1, 2} at random and run Bi, and let δ(F ) = Adv 
We will design B3, B4 so that Due to the space restrictions, the descriptions of B3, B4 are omitted and can be found in [3] .
Recall that δ(WB) = Adv prp-cca WB (Q, n, m, t). Then from Equations (6), (7), (8) Putting this together with Equation (9) we have To complete the proof we show in [3] that Pr[Bad(I 
IMPLEMENTATION
We describe a fast AES-based instantiation of EtE. As a starting point, we need an AES-based tweakable blockcipher. LRW [16] and XEX [15] are possible choices. Both of them require two calls to the base AES blockcipher, but with XEX, one of the calls can be can be made just once and the value cached as the cipher is used to encipher many message blocks. We thus choose XEX. Applying StE to XEX yields a tweakable blockcipher F . Now we need to pick a wideblock cipher to play the role of WB. We pick EME which uses about two blockcipher calls per message block together with overhead for offset computations. Let J be the wideblock tweakable cipher produced by applying EtE to WB and F . We have optimized J and then implemented it and compared its speed to that of EME.
XEX. XEX over a blockcipher E: {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n has tweakspace {0, 1} n × I, where I is the set of integers [1, . . . , 2 n −2]. Arithmetic operations in XEX are done in the field GF(2 n ), with elements of GF(2 n ) viewed interchangeably as n-bit strings, integers in [0, 2 n −1] and as formal polynomials of degree n − 1 with binary coefficients. Addition is bitwise XOR and multiplication of two points is performed by multiplying them as formal polynomials modulo the irreducible polynomial p128(x) = x 127 + x 7 + x 2 + x + 1. XEX is defined byẼ (N,i) K (M ) = EK(M ⊕ ∆) ⊕ ∆ where ∆ = 2 i N and N = EK(N ). For our purposes, we require a much smaller tweak space of two elements. We pick t0 = (0 n , 1) and t1 = (10 n−1 , 1). Now, ∆ can assume only two values (∆0, ∆1) which can be precomputed and cached between successive calls, avoiding running E for the second time to calculate N. The XOR operations still remain, but they are parallelizable, using vector instructions [9] .
Experiments. We compare the speeds of EtE and EME on a processor that has the AES-NI support for executing AES in hardware [11] . Given that EtE is intended for use in disk encryption at the sector level, which happens in hardware, the use of AES-NI is realistic.
Our results show that encrypting with EtE is slower than EME by a modest 15% or less. We ran the tests described below on a Intel Xeon W3690 processor at 3.47 GHz with support for AES-NI running Linux version 2.6 with code compiled using gcc -O3 -ftree-vectorize -msse2 -ffast-math to enable vector instructions and perform other general optimizations. The base code was from Brian Gladman's EME2 implementation [10] , which we modified to run as EME and use the hardware AES instructions.
